Abstract-Shah, Rashmi and Ramchandran recently considered a model for Private Information Retrieval (PIR) where a user wishes to retrieve one of several R-bit messages from a set of n non-colluding servers. Their security model is informationtheoretic. Their paper is the first to consider a model for PIR in which the database is not necessarily replicated, so allowing distributed storage techniques to be used. Shah et al. show that at least R+1 bits must be downloaded from servers, and describe a scheme with linear total storage (in R) that downloads between 2R and 3R bits. For any positive , we provide a construction with the same storage property, that requires at most (1 + )R bits to be downloaded; moreover one variant of our scheme only requires each server to store a bounded number of bits (in the sense of being bounded by a function that is independent of R). We also provide variants of a scheme of Shah et al which downloads exactly R + 1 bits and has quadratic total storage. Finally, we simplify and generalise a lower bound due to Shah et al. on the download complexity of a PIR scheme. In a natural model, we show that an n-server PIR scheme requires at least nR/(n − 1) download bits in many cases, and provide a scheme that meets this bound.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shah, Rashmi and Ramchandran [12] provide bounds on the data downloaded from servers in an interesting variant of the private information retrieval model. The aim of this paper is to study this model further, improving and generalising their schemes and bounds.
A. The PIR Model
In the classical model for private information retrieval (PIR) [6] , a database X is replicated across n servers S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n . A user wishes to retrieve one bit of the database, so sends a query to each server and downloads their reply. The user should be able to deduce the bit from the servers' replies. Moreover, no single server should gain any information on which bit the user wishes to retrieve (without collusion). The resulting protocol is known as (an informationtheoretic) PIR scheme; there are also computational variants of the security model. The goal of PIR is to minimise the total communication between the user and the servers.
The variant of this model due to Shah et al. is closer to what might be implemented in practice. They assume that each database X consists of k records, each of which is R bits in length, so that the number of possible databases is 2 kR . We denote the i th record by R i , and we write X ij for the jth bit of the ith record. The aim of the protocol is for the user to retrieve some record R j , rather than a single bit. Importantly, Shah et al. do not assume the whole database is replicated across the n servers S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n and so, in particular, there is the possibility of using techniques from distributed storage to reduce the total storage of the scheme. No restrictions are made on the particular encoding used to distribute the database across the servers other than to assume it is deterministic, i.e. that there is a unique way to encode each database. This important generalisation of the model has led to very interesting recent work which we discuss in Subsection I-C below.
More combinatorially, we define a private information retrieval scheme as follows.
Definition I.1 (PIR scheme). Suppose a database X is distributed across n servers S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n . A user who wishes to learn the value of record R j submits a query (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ) ∈ Q n for some finite set Q. For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, server S i receives q i and responds with a value c i that depends on q i and on the information stored by S i . The user receives the response (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) ∈ C n for some finite set C. This system is a private information retrieval (PIR) scheme if the following two properties are satisfied:
• (Privacy) For i = 1, 2, . . . , n the value q i received by server S i reveals no information about which record is being sought.
. . , q n ) for record R j , the user is unambiguously able to recover the value of record R j .
Note that while the query is drawn randomly according a pre-specified distribution on a set of potential queries, the response is assumed to be deterministic.
Example I.1. In the case of a single server, a trivial method for achieving PIR is for the user to download the entire kR-bit database.
Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and Sudan showed that in the case of single-bit records (R = 1), if there is a single server then PIR is only possible if the total communication is at least k bits (i.e. the size of the entire database) [6] , and so the solution above is best possible. We are interested in finding solutions such as the scheme below, which transmit significantly fewer than kR bits.
Example I.2. [6] Suppose there are two servers, each storing the entire database. Suppose R = 1.
• A user who requires record R j chooses a k-bit string (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α k ) uniformly at random.
• Server 1 is asked to return the value c 1 
• The user computes c 1 ⊕ c 2 to recover the value of R j .
The strings (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α k ) and (β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β k ) are both uniformly distributed, and are independent of the choice of j, hence neither server receives any information as to which record is being recovered by the user.
We note that the scheme above works unchanged when the records are R-bit strings rather than single bits. The download complexity of the scheme, in other words the total number of bits downloaded from servers, is 2R. The upload complexity is 2k, since each server receives a k-bit string from the user. Thus the total communication of the scheme is 2R + 2k bits, which is significantly less than kR bits for most parameters.
Note that the upload complexity of this scheme does not depend on R, and so is an insignificant proportion of the total communication when R is large. This is a general phenomenon: Chan, Ho and Yamamoto [5, Remark 2] observe the following. Let c > 1 be an integer. Suppose we have an n-server PIR scheme for a database of k records, each R bits long. Suppose the scheme requires u upload bits and d download bits. Then we can construct an n-server PIR scheme for a database of k records, each cR bits long, which requires cd bits of download but still needs just u bits to be uploaded. Note that when c is large (so records are long) the communication complexity of the new scheme is dominated by the download complexity of the given scheme.
Because of the observation of Chan et al; it is vital to find PIR schemes with low download complexity. We formalise download complexity as follows. Definition I.2. A PIR scheme uses binary channels if the response c j sent by server S j is a binary string of length d j , where d j depends only on the query q j it receives. The download complexity is the maximum of the sum n j=1 d j over all possible queries (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ).
We emphasise that the length d j in the definition above does not depend on the database X, but could depend on the query q j received by server S j . We also note that we allow for the possibility that d j = 0, so the server does not reply.
The storage requirements of a PIR scheme are also of great interest: Definition I.3. Suppose server S i stores s i bits of information about the database X.
• The per-server storage of the scheme is max{s i | i = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
• The total storage of the scheme is n i=1 s i . This paper is concerned with schemes whose download complexity is as small as possible, whilst keeping the total storage at reasonable levels.
B. Results
The main results in [12] may be stated as follows:
• A proof that a PIR scheme (in the model above) must have download complexity at least R + 1 when k ≥ 2.
• Explicit PIR schemes that have download complexity R + 1. The scheme considered in detail requires an exponential (in R) number of servers, and so has exponential total storage. However, this scheme has small per-server storage. An aside mentions another scheme where the data is replicated across R + 1 servers; this has quadratic (in R) total storage.
• An explicit PIR scheme that has linear (in R) total storage, and a download complexity of between 2R and 4R (so is within a constant factor of optimality). The paper also contains the claim that a scheme of download complexity R + 1 cannot have total storage that is linear in R, but no proof of this claim is given (and we are not able to construct a proof ourselves).
This paper contains analogues of, and improvements on, each of these results:
In Section II we provide combinatorial results on the structure of a PIR scheme with small download complexity. In particular, this generalises the lower bound on download complexity in [12] . The results imply (Theorem II.5) that an n-server PIR scheme must have download complexity at least n n−1 R when k > R/(n − 1) . This last result can also be obtained as a corollary of a bound due to Sun and Jafar [13] : we discuss their results further in the next subsection.
In Subsection III-A, we provide two simple (R + 1)-server PIR schemes with download complexity R + 1 and total storage which is quadratic in R. The first scheme is a natural generalisation of the scheme of Chor et al given above. The second scheme is a close variant of the quadratic total storage PIR scheme in [12] , which avoids having to design slightly different schemes depending on the parity of R. This second scheme is to be preferred due to its lower upload complexity.
In Subsection III-B, we describe an n-server PIR scheme with download complexity n n−1 R. The total storage of the scheme is linear in R. This shows that for any > 0 there exists a PIR scheme with linear total storage and download complexity at most (1 + )R. We also describe (Subsection III-C) a similar scheme that provides a trade-off between increasing the number of servers and reducing the per-server storage of the scheme.
We refer the reader to the extended version of this paper [3] for proofs, which are omitted here due to lack of space.
C. Context
Private information retrieval was introduced in [6] , and has been an active area ever since. See, for example, Yekhanin [18] for a fairly recent survey.
The papers by Shah et al. [12] and (independently) by Augot, Levy-Dit-Vahel, and Shikfa [1] are the first to consider PIR models where the information stored by servers could be coded using techniques from distributed storage. Whereas [12] is mainly concerned with download complexity, and also with total storage (with per-server storage, and query size also relevant parameters), the paper [1] emphasises measures of robustness against malicious servers, namely decoder locality and PIR locality.
In a sequence of papers, Sun and Jafar [13] , [14] , [15] consider the capacity of channels related to PIR codes in various scenarios, including the presence of colluding servers. (The download rate of a PIR scheme is the download size divided by the message length R, and the download capacity is the supremum of achievable rates.) They use information theoretic techniques to show [13] that an n-server PIR scheme on a k message database has download rate at most
(Their model is restricted to the special case of replication, but it is easy to see that this restriction is not needed for this result to hold.) They also provide a scheme that has this download rate. The messages in their scheme are extremely long for most values of n and k: the message length is
which is exponential in k. In particular, their results show that when R → ∞ with n and k fixed, there are schemes whose download complexity (and so whose communication complexity) has a leading term of the form
and that this term is best possible. Fazeli, Vardy, and Yaakobi [9] show how to use an object they call a PIR code (more generally a PIR array code) to provide a trade-off between the number of servers and the total storage. In particular, for all > 0, they show that there exist good schemes (in terms of communication requirements) where the amount of information stored in a server is bounded but the total storage is at most (1 + ) times the database size. Rao and Vardy [11] study these codes further, with a lower bound on the redundancy of these PIR codes; see also Blackburn and Etzion [2] .
We remark that though it is possible to reduce total storage using the techniques of PIR array codes, it seems impossible to reduce the download complexity of the resulting schemes below (3/2)R (and most codes give download complexity close to 2R) because of restrictions on the PIR rate of such codes.
Fanti and Ramchandran [7] , [8] consider unsynchronized databases; the results are the same as for synchronized PIR at the expense of probabilistic success for information retrieval obtained after two rounds of communication.
Chan, Ho, and Yamamoto [4] , [5] consider the tradeoff between the total storage and download complexity when the size of a record is large; the tradeoff depends on the number of records in the system. Finally, Tajeddine and El Rouayeb [16] , [17] consider PIR schemes where the information is stored using MDS codes. They give PIR algorithms which have optimal download complexity in this model, as they attain the bounds in [4] , in the situation when one or two 'spies' (colluding malicious servers) are present.
II. LOWER BOUNDS ON DOWNLOAD COMPLEXITY
Shah, Rashmi and Ramchandran [12] show that a PIR scheme must have download complexity at least R + 1 when k ≥ 2. Here we provide an alternative approach to proving this fact, which also provides other interesting results on download complexity as corollaries.
Throughout this section, we assume there are n servers, and the database consists of k records of length R.
Definition II.1. We say that a response (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) is possible for a query (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ) if there exists a database X for which (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) is returned as the response to the query (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ) when X is stored by the servers.
The number of possible responses to a given query over all possible databases determines the amount of information that is downloaded by the user. This is a parameter of a PIR scheme that we would like to minimise. Similarly, we would like to minimise the size of each query, and the total amount of data stored by the servers. It is also important to consider the complexity of the computations required by both the user and the servers in carrying out a PIR scheme.
A. General bounds
The following theorem is the key technical result needed for our lower bounds. Without loss of generality we will focus on server S 1 , so for ease of notation we will denote the tuple (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ) by (q 1 , q other ), and (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) by  (c 1 , c other ) . Corollary II.6. Let the database contain k records with k ≥ 3. Any PIR scheme using binary channels with a total download of exactly R + 1 bits requires 1 bit to be downloaded from each of R or R + 1 different servers in response to any query. Construction 1 below, for example, shows that Corollary II.6 cannot be strengthened to the statement that exactly R + 1 servers must respond non-trivially.
The following more precise version of [12, Theorem 1(b)] gives an explicit bound on the probability that R bits are downloaded.
Theorem II.7. Let the database contain k records with k ≥ 3. Suppose we have a PIR scheme using binary channels with a total download of exactly R+1 bits. Suppose a user chooses to retrieve a record chosen with a uniform probability distribution on {1, 2, . . . , k}. Let ϑ be the probability that only R bits are downloaded. Then ϑ ≤ (R + 1)/(kR + 1).
III. CONSTRUCTIONS
Recall the notation from the introduction: our database X consists of k records, each of R bits, and we write X ij for the jth bit of the ith record.
A. Two schemes with download complexity R + 1
This section describes two schemes with download complexity R + 1. The first scheme is included because of its simplicity; it can be thought of as a variation of the scheme of Chor et al. described in Example I.2, and achieves optimal download complexity using only R + 1 servers. It has a total storage requirement which is quadratic in R. But the scheme has high upload complexity: kR(R+1). The second scheme is very closely related to a scheme mentioned in an aside in Shah et al. [12, Section IV] . This scheme has the same properties as the first scheme, except the upload complexity is improved to just (R + 1)k log(R + 1) .
We note that the main scheme described in Shah et al. [12, Section IV] also has optimal download complexity of R + 1. Each server stores just R bits, and so the storage per server is low. However, their scheme uses an exponential (in R) number of servers, and so has exponential total storage.
Construction 1.
The following is an R+1-server PIR scheme with download complexity R + 1. All servers store the whole database, so the scheme has total storage of (R + 1)Rk bits. The upload complexity of the scheme is kR(R + 1).
• A user who requires record R creates a k × R array of bits by drawing its entries α ij uniformly and independently at random.
• To recover the r th bit of record R the user computes c r ⊕ c R+1 .
Our second construction improves upload complexity: it is a variant of Construction 1 where the rows of the array α are all taken from a restricted set {e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e R } of size R + 1.
For i = 1, 2, . . . , R, let e i be the i th unit vector of length R. Let e 0 be the all zero vector. For binary vectors x and y of length R, write x · y be their inner product; so x · y = ⊕ R j=1 x j y j . Construction 2. The following is an R + 1-server PIR scheme with download complexity R + 1, and reduced upload complexity. All servers store the whole database, so the scheme has total storage of (R + 1)Rk bits. The upload complexity of the scheme is kR log(R + 1) .
• A user who requires record R chooses k elements a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k ∈ Z R+1 uniformly and independently at random. For r = 1, . . . , R +1, Server r is sent the vector
, where
• Server r returns the bit c r = 
B. Optimal download complexity for a small number of servers
For an integer n such that (n − 1) divides R, we now describe an n server PIR scheme with download complexity n n−1 R bits. By Theorem II.5, this construction provides schemes with an optimal download complexity for n servers, provided the number k of records is sufficiently large. This construction is closely related to Construction 1 above. 
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otherwise.
• The user recovers the first R/(n − 1) bits of R by computing c 1 ⊕ c n , the next R/(n − 1) bits of R by computing c 2 ⊕ c n and so on.
Shah et al. [12, Section V] provide PIR schemes with linear (in R) total storage and with download complexity between 2R and 4R. Their scheme requires a number of servers which is independent of R (but is linear in k). The construction above (taking n to be fixed but sufficiently large) shows that for any fixed positive a PIR scheme with linear total storage exists with download complexity of (1 + )R: this is within an arbitrarily close factor of optimality. Moreover, the number of servers in our construction is independent of both k and R. However, note that in our scheme each server stores the whole database, whereas the per server storage of the scheme of Shah et al. is a fixed multiple of R.
C. Schemes with small per-server storage
We make the observation that the last construction may be used to give families of schemes with lower per-server storage; see [12, Section V] for similar techniques. • Divide each record into R/s chunks of s bits each. Divide the database into R/s parts of ks bits, the ith part containing the ith chunk of each record.
• Operate R/s copies of the PIR scheme of Construction 3 independently. Each copy uses r servers; no server is used in two copies of the scheme. The ith copy of the scheme operates on the ith part of the database only (and so each server needs to store just one part of the database).
By fixing r and s to be sufficiently large integers, we can see that for all positive we have a family of schemes with download complexity at most (1 + )R, with total storage linear in the database size, with a linear (in R) number of servers, and where the per server storage is independent of R. So this family of schemes has a better download complexity and per-server storage than Shah et al. [12, Section V] , and is comparable in terms of both the number of servers and total storage.
We remark that the above construction still works if the sets of r servers are not disjoint: the storage requirements of those servers in more than one r-set is increased, but the download complexity and total storage are unaffected and the number of servers required is reduced. So various trade-offs are possible using this technique.
